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CITIZENSHIP AND THE LAW OF 
TIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
ELIZABETH F. COHEN∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Who is entitled to become a United States citizen? In an age of 
mass migration, unease over the question of citizenship attribution 
has led to fierce debate about naturalization rules. On every occasion 
in recent history that Congress has held hearings about whether to 
create a pathway to citizenship for its undocumented population, 
many in the United States have actively lobbied against offering even 
a liminal status for long-term resident non-citizens. Such 
disagreement reveals deep normative ambivalence about 
immigration. As a nation, we have never entirely agreed on who 
deserves to be a citizen. 
In this Article I will use the constitutional and legislative history 
of citizenship and naturalization rules in the United States to make an 
argument that we have a long and well-defined history of according 
American citizenship to people based, in large part, on a temporal 
rule of citizenship. This rule identifies moments and durations of time 
that, along with other traits, qualify people for citizenship. The Article 
describes the history of temporal rules of citizenship and, in so doing, 
illustrates why these principles of citizenship are ideally suited for 
making determinations of citizenship under conditions of normative 
disagreement that are complicated by administrative challenges. In 
particular, the Article will point to the way in which time can 
represent a wide array of the norms that even vastly divergent 
ideologies associate with citizenship. Time can simultaneously 
represent assimilation, civic knowledge, social connection, loyalty, and 
many more citizenly traits and experiences. Because time is associated 
with an unusually wide array of citizenship norms, temporally based 
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rules of citizenship forge compromises between conflicting founding 
ideologies. Of most relevance to the subject of this Article is the fact 
that temporal rules circumvent quandaries such as disagreement over 
who deserves to be a citizen. This potential for bridging normative 
divides makes temporal rules of citizenship unusually powerful 
governing instruments. At the same time, temporal rules also ensure 
the smooth functioning of a large-scale state committed to basic 
liberal egalitarian norms. Unlike money or property or even work, 
time is equally available to all people. It proceeds at the same rate 
regardless of one’s ascribed characteristics, social class, or any other 
subjective traits. Using measures of time as a means of assigning 
citizenship rights circumvents the pitfalls inherent in most qualitative, 
subjective, and often inegalitarian measures of fitness for citizenship. 
I. ELIGIBILITY FOR CITIZENSHIP 
Citizenship rules in all nation-states generally fall into two types. 
The first, jus soli, assigns citizenship based on physical presence, 
usually at the time of birth.1 The second, jus sanguinis, assigns 
citizenship based on blood lineage, asking one to prove a relative is or 
was a citizen.2 These principles use either physical presence or blood 
lineage to represent traits such as allegiance, fidelity, and connection 
to the polity or its people. In some cases the rules will be applied in 
conjunction. For example, citizenship is assigned to people born in 
United States territory3 and to children born abroad to American 
parents.4 
A third rule is quietly in operation alongside, and sometimes in 
cooperation with, these two rules. It is a temporal rule of citizenship 
that associates fitness for membership with specific amounts of time. I 
call this jus temporis. Jus temporis is a temporal principle of 
citizenship that allows states to use dates and measurements of 
calendrical or durational time to confer part of or the entire 
citizenship bundle upon individuals and groups. Different types of 
temporal measurement apply in different circumstances. These 
temporal measures are not the only variables for determining 
someone’s readiness for citizenship but they are critical. Jus temporis 
 
 1.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 942 (9th ed. 2009). 
 2.  Id. at 941. 
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
 4.  Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West 2013). 
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produces the probationary periods of time that every nation-state 
demands aspiring citizens wait prior to naturalizing. It can also be 
observed in more local contexts, such as the requirement that legal 
permanent residents reside in the United States for a minimum of five 
years prior to applying for discretionary state benefits, such as 
Temporary Aid for Needy Families.5 A rule of jus temporis is even at 
the heart of rules creating an age of consent, in which the full rights of 
citizenship are bestowed on persons after they have reached a 
predetermined age. In each of these three examples, jus temporis, in 
the form of a temporal threshold or a duration of time, serves to 
represent the development of qualities, relationships, and skills that 
are associated with citizenship. 
Much like jus soli and jus sanguinis use land and blood to 
represent the deeper and intangible kinds of qualities that a society 
deems central to citizenliness, temporal rules of citizenship use time 
in an analogic fashion. In other words, time has come to be used to 
represent core values and norms associated with citizenship.6 This is 
especially true because the social meanings of time are quite elastic, 
offering a wide range of possible values that can be represented using 
time. Time therefore comes to have special agency in the negotiation 
of compromises among different citizenship norms. As this article will 
show, time’s elasticity allows it to represent a full array of the core 
norms that even vastly divergent ideologies associate with citizenship. 
II. TIME AND SOVEREIGNTY 
There are several overarching reasons that time figures so 
prominently in naturalization rules. The first has to do with the 
establishment of sovereignty. Although sovereignty over a territory 
and its inhabitants is generally associated with the rule of law and 
geographical markers, sovereignty is also established at a specific 
time. 
 
 
 
 
 5.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 402, 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1612 (West 2013).  
 6.  As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson describe, societies around the world exhibit a 
common reliance on the value of time for the purpose of creating the building block metaphors 
that are essential to any system of communication. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Conceptual 
Metaphor in Everyday Language, 77 J. PHIL. 453, 456–57 (1980).  
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In the Anglo-American tradition, the precedent for the 
establishment of citizenship, and consequently naturalization, is 
Calvin v. Smith,7 otherwise known as Calvin’s Case. Calvin’s Case also 
establishes the practice of using a date to distinguish between subjects 
of the King and outsiders.8 In 1608, Edward Coke recorded the 
decision in Calvin’s Case stating that persons born in Scotland after 
the ascent of James I to the throne in 1603 (postnati) were to be 
considered subjects in his allegiance, while those born prior to his 
ascent (antenati) were not. The explicit outcome of this decision was 
to make the date of James’s ascent a political boundary between 
subjects and those of the various lesser political statuses that existed 
at the time. The 1603 boundary was as stark as any line on a map or 
border in the earth. Although it could be crossed—naturalization 
could bring the antenati into the political body—even people who 
were “naturalized” had different political statuses than those born 
into it.9 
The authoritative use of time to make a legal distinction between 
antenati and postnati is hardly unique to the early modern or the 
Anglo-American context. Nor is it only deployed in states that use 
place of birth to assign citizenship. The establishment of sovereign 
borders following the breakup of the Soviet Union into its constituent 
republics offers a striking recent instance of the use of specific dates 
to carve out citizenries, in many cases in concert with both jus soli and 
jus sanguinis.10 In those cases, dates were specifically deployed not 
 
 7.  (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.); 7 Co. Rep. 1a.  
 8.  In the literature on citizenship the choice of a date at which all persons present in a 
territory are offered citizenship is frequently referred to as the “zero option.” I am avoiding use 
of this term because I believe it is misleading. In most cases where the term “zero option” is 
used, exceptions (temporal, racial, and otherwise) exist that ensure that segments of the 
population do not actually receive citizenship on the same terms as others. For further 
discussion of the “zero option,” see Rainer Obliger, Ius Sanguinis, in 1 IMMIGRATION AND 
ASYLUM: FROM 1900 TO THE PRESENT 342, 342–46 (Matthew J. Gibney & Randall Hansen eds., 
2005). I am indebted to Kathrine Barnes for drawing my attention to the phrase “zero option” 
citizenship rules.  
 9.  See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 
37–42 (1978) (discussing Craw v. Ramsey, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1075 (C.P.), which 
distinguished between natural-born and naturalized Irishmen in recognizing priority in 
inheritance of an English earl’s estate).  
 10.  These are instances of a larger category of citizenship attribution issues associated with 
“restoration” or “restitution.” See Piotr Korcelli, Current Issues Related to Citizenship and 
Immigration: The Case of Poland, in FROM ALIENS TO CITIZENS: REDEFINING THE STATUS OF 
IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE 121, 199 (Rainer Bauböck ed., 1994); Andre Liebich, Introduction: 
Altneuländer or the Vicissitudes of Citizenship in the New EU States, in CITIZENSHIP POLICIES IN 
THE NEW EUROPE 21, 21–37 (Rainer Bauböck et al. eds., expanded and updated ed. 2009). 
COHEN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  7:58 PM 
2013] CITIZENSHIP AND THE LAW OF TIME 57 
only to mark the assertion of each individual republic’s sovereignty, 
but also to identify the boundaries of their citizenries.11 Latvia, 
Estonia, and Lithuania famously excluded from citizenship large 
numbers of people who had been born in their territories during the 
Soviet era and who were present during separation, but whose 
parents and grandparents had not been present prior to the moment 
at which the Soviet occupation began.12 In these cases the use of 
precise dates is essential to identifying the sovereign boundaries of 
each state, as well as the boundaries that demarcate citizens (postnati) 
from non-citizens (antenati). Citizenship laws in Bulgaria and 
Romania as well as the seven former Yugoslav republics followed 
similar patterns, establishing rules that singled out residence during 
specific time periods. For example, in Macedonia citizenship was 
accorded to an individual 
if on 6 April 1945 he or she had municipal membership on the 
territory of the People’s Republic of Macedonia; if before 30 June 
1948 he or she made a statement in the presence of the town or 
regional council where he or she resided that he or she wished to 
be a citizen of PR Macedonia; or, if on 28 August 1945 he or she 
was a resident outside the territory of the FPR Yugoslavia but 
before 6 April 1941 his or her last municipal membership was 
somewhere on the territory of the People’s Republic of 
Macedonia.13 
Very similar provisions can be found in almost all of the citizenship 
laws instituted following the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Although this article focuses on the Anglo-American context, it is 
worth noting that rules of jus temporis were also invoked in the 
dismantling of the British Empire. Date-based jus temporis was 
applied in the transition of Hong Kong from British rule.14 Similarly, 
despite its association with strong rules of jus sanguinis, Germany’s 
 
 11.  See Jeff Chinn & Lise A. Truex, The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics, 7 J. 
DEMOCRACY 133, 133–34 (1996) (observing that these states defined citizenship following 
independence in 1991 in terms of citizenship at the time of Soviet annexation in 1940).  
 12.  See id. at 134–36 (describing the stringent post-independence naturalization 
requirements these states, especially Latvia and Estonia, imposed on residents who had 
immigrated during the Soviet era).  
 13.  Ljubica Spaskovska, Macedonia’s Nationals, Minorities and Refugees in the Post-
Communist Labyrinths of Citizenship 5–6 (University of Edinburgh School of Law, Working 
Paper No. 2010/05, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1914398. 
 14.  JAMES M. CARROLL, A CONCISE HISTORY OF HONG KONG 239–51 (1987) (discussing 
“[b]ecoming Hong Kongese”). 
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Basic Law (the German constitution) extends citizenship to persons 
present or related to those present as of December 31, 1937, as well as 
to anyone expelled between January 30, 1933 and May 8, 1945, as long 
as those persons were also present after May 8, 1945.15 Temporal 
boundaries are not just the product of moments of establishment and 
dissolution, they are also implicated in rules that states adopt after 
establishment. For example, persons born in the Panama Canal Zone 
after 1904 have long been considered American citizens.16 Similarly, 
the Jones Act granted United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans in 
1917.17 
Time holds singular political potential for the exercise of 
sovereignty. It is common to all political subjects, and yet it necessarily 
has a distinctive meaning within every society. Accordingly, time is 
both universal and particular. It can appear neutrally scientific and 
impartial while simultaneously attaching to a group’s deepest 
normative traditions. Benedict Anderson has famously pointed out 
that shared temporal context, facilitated by the regularization of clock 
time, was crucial to the development of the modern nation-state.18 
More recently, Thomas M. Allen illustrated this process at work in 
eighteenth-century America, writing that America made “time the 
medium for an effusive nationalism.”19 It comes as no surprise then 
that time is so important to sovereignty and subjectivity. Time can 
apply to almost any kind of action or relationship. Time is also 
understood, if differently so, by all people. And despite its universal 
qualities, time also takes on a distinct meaning in any society. Few 
 
 15.  GRUNGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I, art. 116 (Ger.). 
       16.    Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, tit. 3, ch. 1, § 303, 66 Stat. 163, 236 (codified 
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1403 (2006)) (“Any person born in the Canal Zone on or after 
February 26, 2014 . . . whose father or mother or both at the time of birth of such person was or 
is a citizen of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States.”). 
 17.  Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 733 
(2006)). 
 18.  BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTION ON THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 194–95 (1983). Anderson discusses the imposition of the Napoleonic 
calendar as representative of the movement to synchronize the shared experience of an entire 
people. He argues that this was critical to the development of nationhood among disparately 
situated people in newly forming political bodies. Id. passim. 
 19.  THOMAS M. ALLEN, A REPUBLIC IN TIME 23 (2008). Writing about the effect of the 
French Revolution on European identity, Peter Fritzsche proposes a dualist thesis about 
European identity in which shared context and differentiation are produced by the “specific 
temporal identity not unlike the feeling of generation, and separated or decoupled . . . from 
their forebears two or three generations earlier.” PETER FRITZSCHE, STRANDED IN THE 
PRESENT: MODERN TIME AND THE MELANCHOLY OF HISTORY 53 (2004). 
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other things have the potential to be applied to politics in such 
specific and general ways. 
III. TIME AND CITIZENSHIP NORMS 
Although time is crucial to establishing sovereignty, it is also a 
useful tool for connecting political norms and citizenship practices, as 
demonstrated by the development of United States citizenship laws. 
American jurists did not adopt the Calvin’s Case rule of jus soli 
wholesale. What transformed this precedent in the United States 
context were notions of consent that Coke rejected, but which were 
integral to the separation of the colonies from Great Britain.20 Coke 
had established allegiance as perpetual: it began at birth and could 
not be abjured. By contrast, Lockean consent was not ascribed; it was 
only conceivable once a child reached maturity (the age of consent) 
and it could be foresworn.21 Putting this Lockean ideal into practice, 
the founders, legislators, and jurists in the United States constructed a 
consensual government in which citizenship could be subscribed 
within the space of a reasonable period of time. This marriage of 
consent and jus soli was made possible because United States 
citizenship revised the temporal reasoning found in Calvin’s Case. In 
so doing, they ensured that full members of the United States polity 
would be consenting citizens of the republic rather than loyal subjects 
of the king. 
The insertion of consent into common law citizenship norms in 
the United States—which required and employed a different 
understanding of time—began in 1804 with a series of court decisions 
establishing a set of understandings about who was an American 
citizen. The Supreme Court’s earliest words on the subject of the 
American antenati came in the case M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee 
(McIlvaine).22 Leading up to this confrontation had been a series of 
 
 20.   Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith illustrate in careful detail how consent came to 
dominate American conceptions of citizenship. E.g., PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, 
CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 42–43, 49 
(1985); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. 
HISTORY 81–82 (1997). However, even the nation’s most purely consensual rules of citizenship 
attribution required physical presence and therefore some element of jus soli is omnipresent.  
 21.  See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 54–55; SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 20, at 23–25; 
SMITH, supra note 20, at 78–80. On expatriation, see Gerhard Casper, Lecture at the University 
of Chicago Law School: Forswearing Allegiance (May 1, 2008). 
 22. (McIlvaine I) 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280 (1805). The case was reargued in 1808. McIlvaine v. 
Coxe’s Lessee (McIlvaine II), 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209 (1808). “McIlvaine” will be used to refer to 
both McIlvaine I and McIlvaine II. 
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squabbles between the British and Americans about the exact date on 
which United States sovereignty, and hence citizenship, was 
established (1783, upon the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, as the 
British contended, or 1776, as the Americans contended).23 As was 
true of many of the early citizenship cases, McIlvaine involved a 
question of whether an antenatus could inherit land.24 Perhaps 
marking a hangover from the pre-democratic membership defined in 
Calvin’s Case, property ownership, particularly rights associated with 
inheritance of property, was a proxy for citizenship rights far more 
than was the right to vote.25 In McIlvaine, Daniel Coxe’s allegiance 
and eligibility for citizenship were brought into doubt by virtue of the 
fact that he had been a loyalist during the Revolutionary War.26 The 
arguments on each side were complex, pointing to where Coxe 
resided at specific intervals marked by the declaration of war in 1776, 
the signing of Jay’s Treaty in 1794, and interim legislative acts in New 
Jersey that explicitly enumerated the acts that would henceforth be 
considered treasonous.27 Rather than using a single date, as Calvin’s 
 
 23.  KETTNER, supra note 9, at 186–87. The difference of opinion between the British and 
the Americans is directly noted in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 
187–88 (1830) (Story, J., concurring). It may be useful at this point to recall that the period 
under examination roughly corresponds to the period during which French authorities were 
playing all manner of games with time, including the imposition of an entirely alien calendar for 
which time began with the French Revolution. 
 24.  McIlvaine I, 6 U.S. at 210. 
 25.  KETTNER, supra note 9, at 117–18. On the relative openness of the franchise, see 
generally RONALD HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); Ronald Hayduk, Noncitizen Voting Rights: Extending 
the Franchise in the United States, 92 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 52, 57–62 (2003); Jamin B. Raskin, 
Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien 
Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1394 (1993); Sarah Song, Democracy and Noncitizen Voting 
Rights, 13 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 607, 608 (2009). 
       26.    McIlvaine I, 6 U.S. at 334. 
 27.  The Court noted: 
The inquiry which the jury is directed to make, by the act of the 18th of April, 1778, in 
order to lay a foundation for the confiscation of the personal estates of these fugitives 
is, whether the person had, between the 4th of October, 1776, and the 5th of June, 
1777, joined the armies of the king of Great Britain, or otherwise offended against the 
form of his allegiance to the state. The 7th section of this law is peculiarly important, 
because it provides not only for past cases, which had occurred since the 5th of June, 
1777, but for all future cases, and in all of them, the inquiry is to be whether the 
offender has joined the armies of the king, or otherwise offended against the form of 
his allegiance to the state. During all this time, the real estates of these persons 
remained vested in them; and when by the law of the 11th of December, 1778, the 
legislature thought proper to act upon this part of their property, it was declared to be 
forfeited for their offences, not escheatable on the ground of alienage. This last act is 
particularly entitled to attention, as it contains a legislative declaration of the point of 
time, when the right of election to adhere to the old allegiance ceased, and the duties 
of allegiance to the new government commenced.  
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Case had, American jurists began to rely on durations of time to 
establish citizenship. Ultimately the Court declared Coxe to be a 
citizen by virtue of the fact that he had tacitly given consent through 
residence in New Jersey at the time of its founding (the adoption of 
the state constitution) all the way to the point at which New Jersey 
passed laws defining its citizenship requirements. The Court held: 
Daniel Coxe lost his right of election to abandon the American 
cause, and to adhere to his allegiance to the King of Great Britain; 
because he remained in the state of New-Jersey; not only after she 
had declared herself a sovereign state, but after she had passed 
laws by which she pronounced him to be a member of, and in 
allegiance to, the new government.28 
In the language of McIlvaine, Coxe’s citizenship existed because 
he lost his right to elect not to be a citizen, or to adhere to his 
allegiance to the King, by residing in New Jersey during this period of 
time.29 A period of time—rather than the single moment of time 
identified in Calvin’s Case—became a proxy for reasoned consent. 
Thus, the Court identified three interwoven principles of American 
citizenship: consent (“right of election”); jus soli (“remained in the 
state of New-Jersey”); and jus temporis (“not only after she had 
declared herself a sovereign state, but after she had passed laws”).30 
The mutually constitutive relationship between time, place, and 
consent is fleshed out in even more useful detail in the decision 
written by Justice Thompson in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug 
Harbor,31 as well as Justice Story’s frequently cited concurrence. Inglis 
involved an even lengthier hashing out of both the moment at which 
United States sovereignty commenced and the appropriate timeframe 
in which consent, or election, could take place. In the decision, Justice 
Thompson stated: 
The rule as to the point of time at which the American antenati 
ceased to be British subjects, differs in this country and in England, 
as established by the courts of justice in the respective countries. 
 
McIlvaine II, 8 U.S. at 213. 
 28.  Id. at 212. 
 29.  See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 194 (discussing the corollary point that, prior to states 
passing treason laws, individuals were not prosecuted for treason even though Congress had 
defined the crime, implying “that individuals were generally allowed to choose sides before that 
time” (citing BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON 72 (1964))). 
 30.  McIlvaine II, 8 U.S. at 212. Jus sanguinis is an implicit part of the decision as well, 
because if Daniel Coxe had not been Anglo-Saxon, his standing likely would have been denied 
on the basis of his racial origins.  
 31.  28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830). 
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The English rule is to take the date of the treaty of peace in 1783. 
Our rule is to take the date of the [D]eclaration of 
[I]ndependence.32 
On the subject of durational time and consent Thompson noted 
that “[t]o say that the election must have been made before, or 
immediately at the [D]eclaration of [I]ndependence, would render the 
right nugatory.”33 In this way he gave voice to a belief repeated 
throughout antenati cases, asserting that a government that imposed 
itself at a specific date was arbitrary and non-consensual while one to 
which citizens could subscribe within the space of a reasonable period 
of time was consensual. 
Justice Story’s concurrence reaffirmed this relationship between 
durational time and consent by stating that consent requires reason 
and reason occurs in durations of time.34 Story also acknowledged that 
the precedent of McIlvaine contradicted his precise conclusion with 
respect to when allegiance could commence. Story claimed the British 
occupation of New York that began on September 15, 1776 effectively 
muddled any allegiances claimed to begin on July 4, 1776.35 He 
therefore strenuously argued that 1783 be regarded as the cutoff date 
for the period of election.36 Still, Story emphasized that the nature of 
the American Revolution made it crucial that individuals be allowed 
an appropriate duration of time in which to choose their allegiance. 
He wrote: 
The general doctrine asserted in the American courts, has been, 
that natives who were not here at the [D]eclaration of 
[I]ndependence, but were then, and for a long while afterwards 
remained, under British protection, if they returned before the 
treaty of peace, and were here at that period, were to be deemed 
citizens. If they adhered to the British crown up to the time of the 
treaty, they were deemed aliens . . . .37 
 
 32.  Id. at 121. 
 33.  Id. 
       34.   See id. at 159–60 (Story, J., concurring) (noting that following the American Revolution 
people were “entitled to make their own choice, either to remain subjects of the British crown, 
or to become members of the United States” and that this choice was “to be made within a 
reasonable time”).  
       35.    Id. at 164–65 (Story, J., concurring) (“If he was born after the 15th of September 1776, 
and his parents did not elect to become members of the state of New York, but adhered to their 
native allegiance at the time of his birth, then he was born a British subject.”). 
       36.    Id. at 170–71 (Story, J., concurring) (“[T]he treaty of peace of 1783 released all persons 
from any other allegiance than that of the party to whom they adhered, and under whose 
allegiance they were then, de facto, found.”). 
 37.  Id. at 161 (Story, J., concurring). 
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Beyond his assertions about specific moments, Story also drew a 
connection between time and reasoned consent. 
This choice was necessarily to be made within a reasonable time. 
In some cases that time was pointed out by express acts of the 
legislature; and the fact of abiding within the state after it assumed 
independence, or after some other specific period, was declared to 
be an election to become a citizen.38 
What Story’s words tell readers is that consent requires reason, and 
reason is measured in durations of time. 
Even during the war years we can find decisions that illustrate a 
conception of “volitional allegiance” that embraced the idea of a 
temporal duration in which people could elect their own citizenship.39 
For example, Chief Justice McKean wrote that, following a civil war, 
the minority have, individually, an unrestrainable right to remove 
with their property into another country; that a reasonable time 
for that purpose ought to be allowed; and, in short, that none are 
subjects of the adopted government, who have not freely assented 
to it. What is a reasonable time for departure, may, perhaps be 
properly left to the determination of a court and jury.40 
Similarly, North Carolina passed a law in November 1777 allowing 
citizens a period of election lasting until October 1778.41 Writing for 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, Justice Johnston upheld the 
law in Stringer v. Phillips,42 stating that “[t]he Assembly meant to 
retain and actually reserved the power of restoring to such the rights 
which to them once belonged, if within the limited time they would 
apply for that purpose.”43 Delaware followed suit by stretching its 
waiting period for full rights of office-holding to five years.44 
 
 
 38.  Id. at 160 (Story, J., concurring). 
 39.  The term “volitional allegiance” is from KETTNER, supra note 9, at 173–209. 
 40.  Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 58 (1781). 
 41.  Act of 1777, ch. 17, § 2, reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
124 (Walter Clark ed., 1886) (ordering the confiscation of property of all persons that were 
absent from North Carolina on July 4, 1776 or who had left since that time and were still absent 
unless at the next General Assembly, to be held on October 1, 1778, “such Person[s] shall . . . 
appear, and be by the said Assembly admitted to the Privilege of a Citizen of th[e] State”). 
 42.  3 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 158 (1802). 
 43.  Id. at 159. 
 44.  Act of June 11, 1788, ch. 174, § 1, reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
922 (1797) (“[N]o person who shall become . . . a subject of this state, by virtue of this act, shall 
be appointed to any civil office, or eligible as President, Member of the Privy Council or 
General Assembly, unless such person . . . resided within this state five years previous to such 
election or appointment . . . .”). 
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Perhaps the most illustrative, Georgia’s citizenship act affirmed 
what the judicial decisions cited in the preceding paragraphs 
asserted.45 Following the war, Georgia moved from a xenophobic 
system that had singled out Scottish immigrants for exclusion, to rules 
that required an oath, affirmation of character, and a twelve-month 
waiting period.46 Minors who left the country for three or more years 
for their education would, upon their return, be considered aliens for 
the purposes of civil, military, and legislative or executive office for 
the exact length of their absence.47 By instituting such a policy, 
Georgia effectively created a temporal algorithm that both expressed 
and “solved” the problem of Americanization by taking into account a 
person’s age, length of absence, and period of re-immersion in 
American society, economy, and politics.48 
To sum up: In Calvin’s Case, the moment of birth represented the 
commencement of a lifelong obligation (allegiance) to the sovereign 
for his protection.49 McIlvaine, Inglis, and their counterparts in state 
courts further developed the temporal logic of Calvin’s Case in two 
important respects. First, as is commonly acknowledged, they 
predicated citizenship not just on allegiance, but also on consent, 
expressed as “right of election.”50 Coke’s conception of jus soli seemed 
arbitrary to the colonists, who replaced the model of conquest with a 
“right of election” in determining the citizenship of the antenati.51 To 
do so required the second innovation. In the course of making 
decisions with respect to the antenati, the Court became increasingly 
strident about the fact that electing citizenship required a period of 
time during which reason could occur and culminate in consent. The 
time was demarcated by two dates rather than a single moment in 
 
 45.  See generally Act of Feb. 7, 1785, ch. 28, reprinted in 19 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF 
THE STATE OF GEORGIA 375–78 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1911) (“Whereas the many advantages 
and peculiar blessings which this State enjoys, may induce foreigners to apply for a participation 
thereof, and whereas it is the intention of the Legislature to confer those benefits on all such as 
may apply and do merit the same.”). 
 46.  Id.at 376. 
 47.  Id. at 378. 
 48.  The judges writing these decisions had a plethora of far more explicit and concrete 
means for affirming consent, some of which also bore the authority of having been drawn from 
the common law tradition. Oaths of allegiance, for example, were far more direct, concrete, and 
active expressions of consent for a population that had been divided against itself. See generally 
JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 1992).  
 49.  Elizabeth F. Cohen, Jus Tempus in the Magna Carta: The Sovereignty of Time in 
Modern Politics and Citizenship, 43 PS: POL. SCI. POL. 463, 463–66 (2010). 
 50.  McIlvaine II, 8 U.S. (2 Cranch) 209, 212 (1808). 
 51.  KETTNER, supra note 9, at 193. 
COHEN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  7:58 PM 
2013] CITIZENSHIP AND THE LAW OF TIME 65 
time (as would be the case in a royal accession such as James’s in 
1603). Over and over again, judges writing decisions about the 
antenati explicitly called for “reasonable” periods of time in which 
persons could elect to become citizens.52 These durations were, in fact, 
times of actual critical political reasoning during which people had 
information (such as newly adopted constitutions and social and 
political context) available in order for them to make enlightened 
decisions about their consent.53 It was durational time that allowed 
the American form of jus soli to avoid the arbitrary quality of Coke’s 
perpetual allegiance.54 In fact, the decision to assign durational time a 
political value stood in direct opposition to Blackstone’s related 
writing on the subject, which expressly stated that natural allegiance 
was due from the moment of birth because infants were incapable of 
protecting themselves and natural allegiance “[could not] be forfeited, 
cancelled, or altered by any change of time, place, or circumstance.”55 
This contrast between Coke’s jus soli and the early American focus on 
consent was noted in McIlvaine, among other cases.56 As formulated 
by American judges, consent to citizenship occurs within a reasonable 
duration of time and within a specific territory. Because of this, 
 
       52.    E.g., Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. 53, 58 (1781) (“[A]ll of the writers agree, that the 
minority have, individually, an unrestrainable right to remove with their property into another 
country; that a reasonable time for that purpose ought to be allowed; and, in short, that none 
are subjects of the adopted government who have not freely assented to it.”). 
 53.  Here the word “enlightened” is a deliberate reference to the phrase “enlightened 
understanding” that Robert Dahl uses to describe one of his key prerequisites for democratic 
decision-making. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989). 
 54.  Note that the idea of constituting consent through time and place upon the creation of 
a polity is directly analogous to Locke’s formulation of consensual citizenship in an existing 
polity, which also invokes durational time. Locke singles out the duration of time in which a 
child born into a polity matures, and acquires the capacity to give consent. Thus birthright 
citizenship is somewhat of a misnomer, because children do not receive most rights of 
citizenship until they reach the age of consent. This is true of jus soli as well as jus sanguinis, as 
evidenced by Schuck and Smith’s discussion of Burlemaqui’s belief that jus sanguinis allowed 
children a “provisional political membership at birth” and that they could elect full citizenship 
upon reaching maturity. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 20, at 44–46. Indeed, time is critical to 
conferring legitimacy on the kind of “tacit consent” that Locke discusses and that is integral to 
social contractarian democracy. A. John Simmon, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 274, 279 (1976). Although tacit consent is a silent consent, that does not 
necessarily imply that tacit consent is entirely passive. Justice Story went so far in his Inglis 
concurrence as to claim that durational time and residence together formed an “overt act or 
consent . . . to their [citizens’] right of election.” Inglis v. Tr. of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 
Pet.) 99, 159 (1830) (Story, J., concurring) (emphasis added). For a recent discussion of whether 
jus soli is consensual, see generally Matthew Lister, Citizenship, in the Immigration Context, 70 
MD. L. REV. 175 (2010). On Locke’s discussion of the political status of children, see generally 
IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY’S PLACE (1996). 
 55.  SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 20, at 43. 
 56.  E.g., McIlvaine II, 8 U.S. at 211–13. 
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McIlvaine allowed the full incorporation of antenati who were 
ineligible for full subjecthood under the jus soli rules laid out in 
Calvin’s Case. 
What occurs over time is more than an extended mutual “I do” to 
citizenship. As the text of these decisions indicates, time permitted 
would-be citizens to engage in acts of political reason that must occur 
prior to consent.57 The consensus that emerged from these decisions 
was that, in living in the time of election and the sovereign territory of 
the new country, antenati created what I would term a “lived consent,” 
which was neither truly active nor completely tacit in exchange for 
their citizenship. Just as one’s birthplace or blood represents civic 
membership or volkish connection, among other things, time too 
comes to represent intangible qualities and acts of great significance 
to citizenship. The development of citizenly qualities and the 
performance of citizenly acts demands more of aspiring citizens above 
the passive acceptance implied by tacit consent and yet is not so 
demanding as to be inherently exclusionary. 
At this point, two points about jus temporis have been fleshed out: 
First, the use of measured time to establish sovereign boundaries has 
been illustrated in Calvin’s Case as well as in the United States 
precedents that cited Coke’s commentaries. In Calvin’s Case we see 
the invocation of a single date in order to establish a sovereign 
boundary around a citizenry (or proto-citizenry, as the individuals in 
question were subjects and not citizens). Second, the use of measured 
time to represent an intangible political act, in this case reason, has 
also been illustrated. 
Reason is not the only crucial act, trait, or value that time can 
represent. Other processes and traits that were relevant to citizenship 
are linked to these temporal durations. James Kettner’s read on the 
Court’s consistent use of time to demarcate the act of electing 
citizenship is that “[i]t took time to dissipate the bitterness felt toward 
 
 57.  As David Noble points out, the “state of nature” anthropology that Europeans had 
developed by the time of the Enlightenment treated the nation as natural and rational and 
everything outside its boundaries as unnatural and irrational. However, some outsiders were 
deemed capable of reason, hence a period of time in which to engage in political reason was a 
non-metaphorical breach in an otherwise seamless border that guarded the nation from the 
threat posed by the irrational. Thus, persons reared in aristocratic societies could engage their 
capacities during probationary durations of time and become American citizens. Persons who 
were incapable of reasoning were not given this opportunity; even as these people occupied the 
same land as the American nation and were governed by its laws, they were excluded from 
temporal opportunities for inclusion. DAVID W. NOBLE, DEATH OF A NATION: AMERICAN 
CULTURE AND THE END OF EXCEPTIONALISM xxvii (2002). 
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natives or longtime residents who took up arms against their 
neighbors or who otherwise aided the enemy.”58 If we look beyond 
these court cases to political debates about citizenship and 
naturalization, more substantive statements about the purpose of jus 
temporis reveal two further points: First, time held a diverse but 
limited array of normative meanings in the minds of founders and 
early American legislators; second, these legislators established a 
process through which durations of time that represented these norms 
could be exchanged, in this case for political status. 
Not only was American-style democratic citizenship virtually 
unprecedented, so too were its levels of immigration. As even a casual 
observer of American history knows, the ability to attract newcomers 
was essential to the survival of the young nation. In turn, survival was 
also dependent on finding a means with which to politically transform 
these newcomers into citizens in ways that were harmonious with the 
nation’s political underpinnings. 
Prior to the American Revolution, in 1740 Parliament had created 
a naturalization procedure for aliens who settled in America that 
required applicants to have resided in the colonies for at least seven 
years, without being absent more than two consecutive months.59 Most 
colonies had procedures for naturalization that were adopted and 
adapted by the states. Directly following the American Revolution, 
individual states incorporated naturalization procedures into their 
constitutions. Pennsylvania and Vermont identified character, an oath 
of allegiance, and a specified period of residence as prerequisites for 
naturalization.60 North Carolina required an oath of allegiance and 
one year of residency.61 New York required only that the person be a 
state resident, take an oath of allegiance, and renounce any other 
 
 58.  KETTNER, supra note 9, at 203. 
 59.  British Naturalization Act of 1740, 13 Geo. II, c. 7 (Eng.) (providing that after June 1, 
1740, “all persons born out of the legience of His Majesty, His Heirs, or Successors, who have . . 
. or shall inhabit or reside for . . . seven years or more in any of His Majesty’s colonies in 
America . . . shall be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be His Majesty’s natural-born subjects of 
this Kingdom”). 
       60.    PA. CONSTITUTION of 1776, § 42 (requiring “good character,” an “oath or affirmation 
of allegiance,” and “one year’s residence” for naturalization, but requiring a two-year period of 
residence to be eligible for election as a representative of the state); VT. CONSTITUTION of 1777, 
ch. 2, § 38 (same).  
       61.    N.C. CONSTITUTION of 1776, § 40 (requiring foreigners to take an oath of allegiance 
and reside in the state for at least one year to “be deemed a free citizen”). 
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allegiances.62 Other states passed acts describing naturalization 
procedures as well.63 
The bulk of early debates over political incorporation occurred at 
one of two points: during the Constitutional Convention of 1787 when 
the matter of prerequisites for national office-holding was discussed, 
and a few short years later when naturalization for newcomers was 
debated.64 At the Constitutional Convention, discussion was devoted 
to two significant questions related to the citizenship of newcomers. 
First, delegates argued about how many years of residence after 
naturalization new citizens should be required to wait before 
becoming eligible to hold office in either the House or the Senate.65 
Some thought no waiting period would be just while others went so 
far as to advocate for a seven-year bar for the House and a fourteen-
year bar for the Senate.66 Second, the delegates took up the larger 
issue of whether the federal government would have a monopoly on 
the power to grant naturalization. Lack of uniformity in this regard 
was of concern to the founders, who believed that consequential 
forms of confusion would arise if the states continued to impose 
divergent rules about something as fundamental as citizenship.67 The 
United States would need its own procedures for handling 
immigration once a sovereign state had been established. This ensured 
that citizenship and naturalization were among the earliest and most 
fiercely contested subjects taken up by delegates in 1787, and again 
when the newly formed legislature took up and passed the aptly 
 
       62.   N.Y. CONSTITUTION of 1777, § 42 (requiring a person to settle in the state, take an oath 
of allegiance, and “abjure and renounce all allegiance and subjection to all and every foreign 
king, prince, potentate, and State in all matters” to be eligible for naturalization). 
 63.  It is worth observing that, unlike the court decisions discussed earlier, legislative 
naturalization acts linked durational residence more to the franchise of voting than to the right 
to own and bequeath property to one’s heirs. In several cases (arising in Pennsylvania, Vermont, 
Maryland, and Virginia) the probationary period was explicitly designated for voting and office-
holding rights; all other rights of citizenship were accorded based on oaths of allegiance. 
KETTNER, supra note 9, at 214–15.  
 64.  See generally JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966). The debates from June 15, August 9, and August 13, 1787 are 
of particular relevance. See id. at 118–21, 414–25, 437–50. 
 65.  KETTNER, supra note 9, at 224–27 (analyzing the debates). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  In 1782, James Madison wrote to Edmund Randolph that he was worried about “the 
intrusion of obnoxious aliens through other States” and that he believed a “uniform rule of 
naturalization ought certainly to be recommended to the States.” Letter from James Madison to 
Edmund Randolph (Aug. 27, 1782), available at http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-
new2?id=DelVol19.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/English/modeng/parsed&tag=pu
blic&part=68&division=div1. 
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named Uniform Rule of Naturalization in 1790.68 There was serious 
disagreement about whether creating a uniform rule for 
naturalization would trample state rights or ensure egalitarian 
treatment for new immigrants.69 
Bearing out the larger point made earlier, durational time 
immediately came to the fore as the primary means of effecting 
uniformity in citizenship while also taking into account the concerns 
of skeptics who sought to reserve this power for the states. William 
Patterson introduced the idea of bringing “harmony” to the 
patchwork of state naturalization rules on June 15, 1787.70 However, 
the periods of time recommended by different key players varied 
substantially. The committee reports recommended a three-year 
waiting period before allowing a naturalized foreign-born person into 
the House of Representatives and a four-year period for the Senate.71 
Madison’s record of the deliberations shows intense disagreement 
over whether the waiting periods were so long as to “give a tincture of 
illiberality to the Constitution” and “discourage the most desirable 
class of people from emigrating.”72 George Mason demanded a seven-
year period for the House in order to prevent “foreigners and 
adventurers” from making American law and to ensure adequate civic 
knowledge for all lawmakers.73 Mason even worried about foreign 
conspiracies to purchase influence in the United States.74 Gouverneur 
Morris and Charles Pinckney advocated a fourteen-year wait for the 
Senate.75 
 
 
 
 68.  See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. 
 69.  See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 239–40 (summarizing the arguments on both sides). 
 70.  MADISON, supra note 64, at 128. 
 71.  Rutledge delivered the committee report on August 6, 1787. Article IV, Section 2 
stated that members of the House of Representatives “shall be of the age of twenty-five years at 
least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least three years before his election; 
and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the state in which he shall be chosen.” Id. 
at 386. Article V, Section 3 stated: 
Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of thirty years at least; shall have 
been a citizen in the United States for at least four years before his election; and 
shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the state for which he shall be 
chosen. 
Id. at 387. 
 72. Id. at 419. 
 73.  KATE MASON ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 1725-1792 149 (1892). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  MADISON, supra note 64, at 418. 
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In Morris’s appeal for “reason” on the subject, he analogized 
between making offices available to recently naturalized foreigners 
and reports that some tribes of Indians had offered their daughters 
and wives to strangers as signs of hospitality.76 Furthermore, he 
believed the loyalty of foreigners would always be to their first 
governments.77 Nativists such as Elbridge Gerry and Pierce Butler 
ultimately sought to exclude the foreign-born from holding public 
office entirely.78 Butler believed that not only were foreigners likely 
still “attached” to their native governments, but simply unable to 
abandon their very different notions of government.79 Oliver 
Ellsworth disputed this, arguing that it would discourage the very 
sorts of immigrants that the country ought to recruit for admission.80 
Franklin and Madison concurred.81 James Wilson wryly pointed out 
that he, as a foreign-born person, would be prevented by such a rule 
from serving in a body that he had taken part in crafting.82 Wilson also 
demonstrated that foreigners had made valuable contributions during 
the Revolution.83 
The final result of the negotiation was a nine-year waiting period 
for the Senate and a seven-year waiting period for the House.84 
Candidates for the office of President were initially only required to 
have been a resident for twenty-one years;85 this was later amended to 
require that they be natural-born citizens.86 Although it represents too 
serious a digression to explore further at this juncture, it should not 
pass unnoticed that questions of the political status of naturalized 
persons were hardly the only matters to which the delegates applied 
answers drawing upon temporal algorithms. The very matter of the 
timing of elections in the upper and lower houses, as well as term 
limits, evince the same core belief: Durations of time (e.g., term 
lengths) could be inserted into equations along with other variables 
(for example the number of delegates and the respective powers of 
 
 76.  Id. at 421. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 418. 
 81.  Id. at 419–20. 
 82.  Id. at 420. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
 85. Presidential Eligibility, CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, http://constitution.org/abus/pres_elig. 
htm (last updated July 1, 2013). 
 86.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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the two houses) to produce virtuous, effective, democratic 
governance. 
These debates continued within the federal legislature. One of the 
first acts of the new Congress was to pass a bill that detailed how the 
federal government’s power to naturalize new citizens could be 
exercised.87 Just as their judicial counterparts engaged in the task of 
determining how specific moments in time would divide citizens from 
non-citizens, legislators argued over what durational time meant and 
how it could be used incrementally both to include and exclude 
newcomers. To read the debates over the Uniform Rule of 
Naturalization is to come face to face with an almost obsessive 
concern with the meaning of specific durations of time for 
citizenship.88 The legislature worried equally about the dangers of 
admitting people into political enfranchisement immediately upon 
arrival and, alternatively, in a progressive but piecemeal fashion after 
passing temporal thresholds. All of the worries and aspirations of the 
representatives—their concern about foreign influence and purchase 
of offices, of creating inequalities among the population, of what 
people with foreign attachments might accomplish, of becoming an 
illiberal society—were expressed by arguing for different durational 
residence requirements for newcomers. The sheer volume and range 
of discussion about the meaning of time, the fairness of temporal 
rules, and the effect time has on the division of citizenship into semi-
citizenships is surprising, perhaps in part because contemporary 
academic attention has focused on the relative importance of jus 
sanguinis, jus soli, and consent to early immigration laws. Just as 
birthplace, blood lineage, and consent each represent intangible 
qualities necessary for citizenship, the legislators quoted above 
thought that time could measure abstract traits. 
A significant point of contention attached to the terms of the 
Uniform Rule of Naturalization centered on whether an oath of 
allegiance would suffice to qualify someone for naturalization or 
whether a probationary residence time period was necessary. A 
 
       87.    See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. 
 88.  Most scholars of citizenship who have studied the Rule of Uniform Naturalization 
attend to its presumption of jus sanguinis, pointing out that racialized restrictions were so 
ingrained that the discussion of the Act did not include deliberation over whether non-whites 
could naturalize. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 
IN U.S. HISTORY 153 (1997);  Barbara Welke, Law, Personhood, and Citizenship in the Long 
Nineteenth Century: The Borders of Belonging, in The CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN 
AMERICA 345, 346–48 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).   
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consensus quickly emerged that some sort of probationary period was 
in fact important to demand of would-be citizens.89 Once one stops to 
consider that other means of measuring the traits of good citizens 
exist (such as loyalty oaths, tests, and property ownership, each of 
which had appeared in many of the individual colonies’ rules about 
incorporation),90 it is striking to observe that the legislative debates 
over the Uniform Rule of Naturalization and the related rules that 
followed its passage focus almost exclusively on how many years 
immigrants ought to wait before they could naturalize. The consensus 
on making newcomers wait for citizenship is all the more notable in a 
context where new citizens were so actively sought and needed.91 
Parsing these debates makes evident the degree to which linking 
intangible values such as loyalty and civic incorporation to durational 
time, measureable in precise increments by clocks and calendars, 
facilitated the development of an algorithmic formula for the 
extension of rights to foreign-born persons. The concept of a 
probationary duration was not an American innovation. It can be 
traced back to Roman laws pertaining to the status of newly (and less 
newly) conquered people.92 However, the English common law 
precedents to which Americans turned for guidance in creating their 
own citizenship rules did not allow for the full naturalization of 
newcomers.93 American legislators advocating probationary periods 
prior to naturalization referred to the Roman practice of requiring 
probationary periods to ratify the practice, but their justifications for 
the probationary period make reference to the qualities and values of 
American citizenship rather than the authority of any predecessor. 
The congressmen debating the Uniform Rule of Naturalization 
referred to a diverse yet limited set of values that they believed time 
represented. Like Coke and the American judges who would later 
 
 89.  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1146–58 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790). 
 90.  See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 179–80 (discussing the naturalization rules adopted by 
several colonies). 
 91.  Kettner points out that early America witnessed a “chronic labor shortage” that could 
be remedied only by actively enticing new arrivals. Id. at 107.  
 92.  See A. N. SHERWIN-WHITE, THE ROMAN CITIZENSHIP 61 (2d ed. 1973) (describing the 
process of Roman conquest and incorporation as one that required “a probationary period 
during which these peoples were brought under the influence of Romano-Latin discipline and 
culture”); see also RANDALL S. HOWARTH, THE ORIGINS OF ROMAN CITIZENSHIP 4–5 (2006) 
(detailing the founders’ consultation of Roman sources during the drafting of the Constitution).  
 93.  See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 37–42 (noting that naturalization implied significant 
differences between naturalized and natural born subjects, which was made explicit in Ramsey, 
where it was determined that Irish antenati who had been naturalized were still aliens in 
England). 
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draw on his ideas, some legislators identified probationary time 
periods prior to naturalization as a means of measuring “fidelity and 
allegiance.”94 But allegiance, which treats the loyalty of citizens as a 
debt incurred from the protection of a sovereign, is only one value 
that the participants in the debate associated with probationary 
periods. Thomas Hartley, for example, noted that “an actual residence 
of such a length of time as would give a man an opportunity of 
esteeming the Government from knowing its intrinsic value, was 
essentially necessary to assure us of a man’s becoming a good 
citizen.”95   
Other advocates of a probationary time period, including James 
Madison, connected the amount of time an immigrant is in residence 
with understanding the value of citizenship itself, rather than just 
understanding the government and laws.96 Similarly (though with a 
different emphasis), Representative Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts also connected a probationary time period with 
shedding “prejudices of education, acquired under monarchical and 
aristocratical governments [that] may deprive [potential citizens] of 
that zest for pure republicanism which is necessary in order to taste its 
beneficence” and, taking this one step further, with forms of civic 
knowledge that will make them good citizens.97 Representative James 
Jackson of Georgia wanted “to see the title of citizen of America as 
highly venerated and respected as was that of old Rome.”98Jackson 
stated: “I am clearly of the opinion, that rather than have the common 
class of vagrants, paupers, and other outcasts of Europe, that we had 
better be as we are, and trust to the natural increase of our population 
for inhabitants.”99 He went on to insist that a period of residence was a 
conduit for obtaining testimonials to the character of persons seeking 
citizenship.100 He thought we must test the propriety and decency of 
every potential citizen.101 
 
 
 94.  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1147. 
 95.  Id. at 1147–48. 
 96.  See id. at 1150 (quoting Madison saying, with regard to naturalization, “it is to increase 
the wealth and strength of our community; and those who acquire the rights of citizenship 
without adding to the strength or wealth of the community are not the people we are in want 
of”). 
 97.  Id. at 1156. 
 98.  Id. at 1152. 
       99.    Id. 
 100.  Id. at 1153. 
 101.  Id. 
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Besides the length of the probationary period, other subsidiary 
temporal issues were raised. For example, a debate ensued over the 
importance of continuity in time: Could probationary periods that 
were interrupted disqualify someone from meeting the standard for 
citizenship?102 White went so far as to argue for denationalizing 
citizens who left and stayed abroad for a specified length of time.103 
Even as many supported the idea of a probationary period, a 
number of influential congressmen also recognized that it would be 
both constitutionally and morally problematic to legislate the creation 
of semi-citizenships according only partial rights to some persons. 
James Madison, William Smith, and Elias Boudinot were particularly 
outspoken on this topic.104 Madison voiced concerns that merged the 
normative with procedural questions, asking whether a probationary 
period that sliced up citizenship into semi-citizenships would be 
unconstitutional, or at a minimum antithetical to the egalitarian 
foundations of the Constitution.105 Representative William Loughton 
Smith of South Carolina asserted that a progressive rule of 
naturalization (according some rights upon arrival and various others 
after specified lengths of residence) went against the charge to create 
one rule of uniform naturalization.106 Even Jackson, who deeply 
distrusted extending American citizenship too widely, referred to 
Blackstone’s commentaries to make the point that citizenship cannot 
be conferred progressively or piecemeal (except the right to hold 
office).107 Additionally, Page argued that European nations that 
required longer time restrictions did so because they were more 
bigoted and prejudiced against foreigners/neighbors.108 This likely 
contributed to the fact that the Uniform Rule of Naturalization Act 
required only a two-year period of residence prior to naturalization.109 
 
 102.  See FRANK GEORGE FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (Arno Press, Inc. 1969) (1906) (“Uninterrupted time remains 
significant to the naturalization process. Legal permanent residents of the United States may 
not leave the country for extended periods of time while seeking to naturalize.”). 
 103.  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1149.  
 104.  In fact, the Constitution itself had created semi-citizenships on all sorts of bases, 
including temporally defined restrictions on the election of the foreign-born to Congress 
described above. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
 105.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1149–50. 
 106.  Id. The issue of creating different forms of citizenship, some with lesser and greater 
rights was a sensitive one for many who regarded separation from Great Britain as an act of 
defiance against the lesser status of the colonists in the empire. See id. 
 107.  See id. at 1158. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (requiring candidates to 
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The probationary period of the Act in effect allowed people not 
born with American citizenship to exchange two years of their time 
for the status of citizen. The crafters of the bill were aware that they 
were instantiating such a process. Hartley actually makes a direct 
reference to the fact that time has a political exchange value, 
excoriating states in which men could become citizens immediately 
upon arrival for making citizenship too “cheap.”110 And the appeal of 
temporal algorithms equating time-in-residence with qualifications-
for-citizenship was so great that in the Naturalization Act of 1795, 
only five years after the passage of the Uniform Rule of 
Naturalization, advocates of a longer probationary time period 
succeeded in replacing the two-year threshold with a five-year term.111 
Furthermore, foreign-born persons were ordered to declare their 
intent to naturalize three years prior to their admission,112 thus 
marking another important temporal boundary for prospective 
citizens. It is interesting to note that the parties who supported the 
new restrictions held otherwise politically divergent opinions and had 
very different reasons for supporting the change.113 In fact, increasing 
the probationary period was one of the few issues agreed upon by the 
representatives discussing the Naturalization Law.114 By the time 
alienage (as opposed to naturalization)115 legislation came onto the 
agenda in the form of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the 
threshold had been raised to fourteen years.116 Thus later discussions 
of amending the durational waiting period for citizenship were now 
complicated by the existence of the Naturalization Act of 1795 and its 
 
reside in the United States for two years to be eligible for naturalization). 
 110.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1148. 
 111.  Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414 (requiring candidates to reside 
in the United States for five years to be eligible for naturalization). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  KETTNER, supra note 9, at 240. Kettner claims that Jeffersonians were generally 
interested in excluding “merchants and aristocrats” while Federalists at the time were more 
concerned by threats to political stability. Id. 
 114.  See id. (“[B]oth Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans could agree on the 
desirability of tightening the government’s naturalization policy.”). This supports the thesis that 
relying on durational time as a means to represent values in politics brokers compromises of the 
sort required by liberal democracies, under whose auspices equal justice must be meted to very 
differently situated persons. 
 115.  Alienage law differentiates laws governing the treatment and rights of non-citizens 
living in the United States and is distinct from both immigration law and naturalization law. 
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP 222 (2006).  
 116.  Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, § 1, 1 Stat. 566, 566.  
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temporal declaration requirement of three years.117  
To summarize, the new Acts had to address: (1) aliens in the 
United States prior to the adoption of the Constitution who were not 
naturalized by a state law prior to the Uniform Rule of 
Naturalization; (2) all aliens who might have been naturalized by the 
Uniform Rule of Naturalization; and (3) those who had declared their 
intent to become citizens by the Naturalization Act of 1795.118 
In short, the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 created three 
different sets of antenati119 based on the two preceding probationary 
time periods and the declaration time period. In order to institute a 
new fourteen-year probationary period, Congress had to do 
something about the potential citizens to whom earlier laws applied. 
Although this was resolved relatively easily by grandfathering the 
earlier arrivals under the earlier laws, it points to the very fragmenting 
of citizenship that people like Smith had worried about.120 Not only 
was citizenship being accorded piecemeal over a period of time, but 
people who were otherwise similarly situated aside from having 
arrived on different dates were being treated very differently. The 
deliberations over the bill reveal that the men discussing it were 
keenly aware of the fine line they walked as they sought to exclude 
from the demos titled nobles and other persons with strong 
aristocratic attachments, while advocating a temporal hierarchy of 
immigrant statuses in the United States.121 
Debate over a probationary period continued through 1802, when 
the duration was revised back to five years upon the urging of 
Hamilton, among others. Hamilton wrote: 
Some reasonable term ought to be allowed for aliens to get rid of 
foreign and acquire American attachments; to learn the principles 
and imbibe the spirit of our government; and to admit the 
probability at least of feeling a real interest in our affairs. A 
residence of at least 5 years ought to be required. If the rights of 
 
 117.  Naturalization Act of 1795 § 1. 
 118.  FRANKLIN, supra note 102, at 84. 
 119.  Technically they were “arrived prior” rather than “born prior.” 
 120.  See supra text accompanying note 106. 
 121.  FRANKLIN, supra note 102, at 84–87. A non-trivial postscript to the passage of the 
Alien Act of 1798 is the fact that it also specifies that the power to restrain or remove alien 
enemy males applied to persons fourteen years or older. Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 577, 577 (1798). This fourteen-year duration marked a final temporal boundary to the 
population, on one side of which lay children without political standing, and on the other adults 
who did possess standing. Although ages of majority and ages of license are significant instances 
of jus temporis, they cannot adequately be addressed in this Article without a lengthy digression.  
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naturalization may be communicated by parts . . . those peculiar to 
the conducting of business and the acquisition of property, might 
be at once conferred, upon receiving proof . . . of the intention of 
the candidates to become citizens.122 
Once again, we find reason joined with the idea of consent and 
egalitarian processes of political incorporation into citizenship. 
IV. CITIZENLY TRAITS, EXPERIENCES, RELATIONSHIPS, AND 
NORMS EXPRESSED IN DURATIONAL TIME 
To defend the probationary period they sought, advocates of the 
various positions identified above were forced to articulate a precisely 
defined range of meanings that time could hold. Judicial language 
linked durational time to consent, political reason, and the dissipation 
of bitterness following the Revolutionary War. In my reading of the 
naturalization debates, the congressmen involved in crafting the bills 
variously suggested that time be used to represent the following traits: 
allegiance; fidelity; valuation of the United States government; civic 
knowledge; the degree to which prior allegiances had been shed; and 
an intent to settle in the United States permanently. 
Why were judges and legislators so confident that traits such as 
loyalty, civic virtue, or familiarity could be represented using 
durations of time? Recall that at the outset of this article, it was 
pointed out that all principles of citizenship both carry some direct 
meaning and hold much larger symbolic significance.123 Insofar as they 
represent otherwise intangible personal qualities, rules of citizenship 
are always translating abstract traits into concrete terms. This is as 
true of jus temporis as it is of any other principles used to draw lines 
between citizens and non-citizens. And yet, like each of the other 
three principles—jus soli, jus sanguinis, and consent—jus temporis 
exists as a political principle because it can accomplish something that 
the other three cannot. 
Of the qualities that were identified in the debates, experience, 
knowledge/familiarity, and the shedding of prejudice seem intuitively 
likely to develop over time. However, each can also develop as a 
product of specific efforts and actions that are identified using means 
other than durations of time. Experiences can be isolated events, for 
 
 122.  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 6 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 776–77 (Henry 
Cabot Lodge ed., 1885). 
 123.  See supra pp. 53–54. 
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example military valor, marriage, and labor.124 Each of these events 
can be described in primarily qualitative terms. Yet, those qualitative 
terms are inadequate for the purposes of both administrative 
efficiency and normative compromise. 
Time’s abstract quality is of special relevance to liberal agencies 
that seek to forge compromises between thickly situated democratic 
norms and the impartial universalist aspirations of those liberal 
norms.125 It allows people who are morally equal according to liberal 
theory to become politically equal (or politically “more equal”) in the 
eyes of a particular democratic polity. In theory, time is equally 
available to people of all social classes, races, etc., as long as they are 
considered moral equals. Historian Lynn Hunt describes the modern 
time schema as a dimension that is “universal, homogenous, and ‘deep’ 
in the sense of stretching back very, very far in time.”126 This allows 
time special agency in the negotiation of compromises among 
different citizenship norms. Time can come to represent a full array of 
the core norms that even vastly divergent ideologies associate with 
citizenship. 
CONCLUSION 
I set out in this Article to demonstrate that a temporal rule of 
citizenship is uniquely capable of brokering compromises among 
disparate and sometimes even contradictory notions of citizenship. I 
began by demonstrating that a rule of time is integral to the 
establishment of sovereignty. Because time and sovereignty are 
imbricated, the constitution of a sovereign demos is also likely to 
invoke temporal rules, particularly with respect to naturalization laws. 
United States constitutional jurisprudence about the establishment of 
citizenship shows a heavy reliance on time to represent reasoned 
consent. Our legislative debates about naturalization reveal less 
consensus about the qualities that new citizens ought to demonstrate 
and yet settle on a rule very similar to that of the Supreme Court: 
Newly arrived citizens must wait a probationary period of time before 
becoming eligible to naturalize. 
 
 124.  See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 
200–27 (2002) (discussing marriage and citizenship). See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, 
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1995) (discussing military service and citizenship). 
 125.  See ELIZABETH COHEN, SEMI-CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 95–149 (2009).  
 126.  LYNN HUNT, MEASURING TIME, MAKING HISTORY 39 (2008).  
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Once we recognize the importance of temporal rules to citizenship 
they become apparent in myriad forms. The age of consent, which 
confers citizenship on adults, is a temporal rule. Prison sentences that 
deny criminals rights for specific durations of time are also temporal 
rules. Time is both an administratively convenient and normatively 
freighted way to represent our most deeply held—and sometimes 
fiercely contested—beliefs about citizenship. Without question, 
temporal rules will also continue to play a key part in settling thorny 
citizenship questions that remain on the political horizon. Time 
figured prominently in the 1986 immigration “amnesty.” Similarly, 
temporal rules have already played a central role in the 2013 
congressional immigration proposals and hearings.127 And given the 
unique role of temporal rules in establishing sovereignty and 
maintaining political accord, we can fully expect that temporal rules 
will be a part of any future changes to naturalization and citizenship 
laws that emerge beyond our current political horizon. 
 
 
 127.  See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fixing our Broken Immigration 
System so Everyone Plays by the Rules (Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system-so-
everyone-plays-rules; Charles Schumer et al., Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform, C-SPAN, http://www.c-span.org/uploadedFiles/Content/Documents/ 
Bipartisan-Framework-For-Immigration-Reform.pdf. The waiting period for regularization and 
citizenship has become central to the compromises being brokered between the Democrats and 
Republicans trying to sponsor bipartisan immigration reform. One of the initial planks of the 
Senate plan as well as the proposal issued by the White House involved sending undocumented 
immigrants to the “back of the line” to wait for citizenship. After much public discussion of the 
fact that there is no single line for Green Cards, President Obama amended his initial, more 
punitive stance to include a limit of an eight-year wait for regularization.  
 
